Robot transparency, trust and utility by Wortham, Robert H & Theodorou, Andreas
        
Citation for published version:
Wortham, RH & Theodorou, A 2017, 'Robot transparency, trust and utility', Connection Science, vol. 29, no. 3,
pp. 242-248. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540091.2017.1313816
DOI:
10.1080/09540091.2017.1313816
Publication date:
2017
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
“This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Connection Science on 30th May
2017, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09540091.2017.1313816.”
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
March 27, 2017 Connection Science transparency
To appear in Connection Science
Vol. 00, No. 00, January 2017, 1–7
Robot Transparency, Trust and Utility
Robert H. Worthama∗ and Andreas Theodoroua
a Department of Computer Science, University of Bath, Bath, UK
(v1.1 released January 2017)
As robot reasoning becomes more complex, debugging becomes increasingly hard based solely
on observable behaviour, even for robot designers and technical specialists. Similarly, non-
specialist users have difficulty creating useful mental models of robot reasoning from obser-
vations of robot behaviour. The EPSRC Principles of Robotics mandate that our artefacts
should be transparent, but what does this mean in practice, and how does transparency af-
fect both trust and utility? We investigate this relationship in the literature and find it to
be complex, particularly in non industrial environments where, depending on the application
and purpose of the robot, transparency may have a wider range of effects on trust and utility.
We outline our programme of research to support our assertion that it is nevertheless possi-
ble to create transparent agents that are emotionally engaging despite having a transparent
machine nature.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The EPSRC Principles of Robotics include a specific reference to transparency: “Robots
are manufactured artefacts. They should not be designed in a deceptive way to exploit
vulnerable users; instead their machine nature should be transparent.” (Boden et al.,
2011). This initially appears to be a straightforward normative assertion, drawing on the
commonly held idea that agents should not be deceptive, since deception generally leads
to exploitation. This paper considers whether in fact transparency is really such a simple
idea, and also whether making certain types of agents transparent reduces their utility.
In considering this question, we must also address the relationship between transparency
and trust.
In this paper, we use the term agent to mean an autonomous intelligent entity that
acts in some world. We use the term robot as a subclass of agent, and mean it to be an
∗Corresponding author. Email: r.h.wortham@bath.ac.uk
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artefact that operates in the physical world.
What does it mean to trust a robot? We might initially simply assert that if a robot
is more transparent, then we are able to trust it more, and therefore its utility increases.
Here, we are using transparency to mean the extent to which the internal state and
decision making processes of a robot are accessible to the user. We could also argue that
trust is only required when a robot is not fully transparent, and therefore that increased
transparency reduces the need for trust (Bryson & Rauwolf, 2017).
In the case of companion robots, trust is an important component of the purpose of the
robot. The user must trust the robot in order to consider it a worthy companion. Thus,
if the utility of a robot is measured by the degree to which it is trusted, then increasing
transparency may reduce that utility.
So, we start to see that there is a complex relationship between the ideas of utility,
transparency and trust. This relationship will depend on the purpose of the robot. In this
paper we review the literature relating to transparency and trust, and we also describe
ongoing practical research to investigate the proposal that it is indeed possible build an
emotionally engaging yet transparent robot.
2. THEORY OF MIND, TRUST AND TRANSPARENCY
Although we may presuppose that communication between animals, and particularly
between humans must be complex, in fact natural communication systems tend to ex-
ploit relatively simple and minimal signals, the meaning of which derives from extensive
models (Wortham & Bryson, 2016) — that is to say, pre-existing shared paradigms and
semantic relationships. In other words, evolution, or a shared phylogenetic history, pro-
vides adequate priors such that minimal data is required to communicate context.
Although some would argue otherwise (Gallagher, 2006), it is generally agreed that
effective interaction, whether coercion or co-operation, relies on each party having some
theory-of-mind (ToM) of the other (Saxe, Schulz, & Jiang, 2006). Individual actions
and composite behaviours are thus interpreted within a pre-existing ToM framework.
Whether that ToM is accurate is unimportant, provided that it is predictive in terms of
behaviour.
The robot’s transparency model does not define the ToM employed by the human user,
but it is the transparency model that we can directly adjust and this is therefore the
focus of this paper.
It is well known that observable behaviour can communicate the internal mental states
of the individual. Breazeal, Kidd, Thomaz, Hoffman, and Berlin (2005) found that im-
plicit non-verbal communication improves transparency over that of only deliberate non-
verbal communication. Here, implicit is defined as conveying information inherent in
behaviour but which is not deliberately communicated by the robot designer. People
have strong expectations for how implicit and explicit non-verbal cues map to mental
states.
Breazeal et al. also found that transparency reduces conflict when errors occur, partic-
ularly when a joint task is being attempted. Reduced conflict implies that when an error
occurs during task execution, recovery is still possible with less apportionment of blame.
Breazeal et al. term this reduced conflict robustness, and this robustness is one effective
measure of utility.
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2.1. Anthropomorphism and Mental Models of Robots
Humans have a strong predisposition to anthropomorphise not only nature, but any-
thing around them (Dautenhahn, 2007). The Social Brain Hypothesis (Dunbar, 1998)
may explain this phenomenon, however humans do not treat robots identically to hu-
mans, for example with respect to moral standing (Kahn, Ishiguro, Friedman, & Kanda,
2006). Although there is significant debate about the ontology of robot minds versus
human minds, what is of more practical importance is how robot minds are understood
psychologically by humans, i.e. what is the perceived, rather than actual, ontology.
Stubbs, Hinds, and Wettergreen (2007) consider it essential to form a mental model of
robots in order to build common ground — which we might also interpret as the basis
for human trust. Stubbs et al. also found that this common ground can be effectively
established via an interactive dialogue with the robot. Although this study primarily
considered remote robots working in an industrial or exploratory setting, rather than
robots operating in domestic environments, we should take note of the importance of
dialogue in establishing trust. Indeed Mueller (2016) sees dialogue as one of the three
main characteristics of transparent computers, the others being explanation and learning.
Meerbeek, Hoonhout, Bingley, and Terken (2006) investigates the relationship between
a robot’s perceived personality and the level to which the user feels in control during
the interaction. In order to be believable, Meerbeek et al. found that the personality
expression should be linked to an internal model that deals with the behaviour (e.g.
decision making) based on personality and emotion. More expressive, informal behaviour
is associated with a higher perception of user control.
Non-specialist humans either have little ToM for robots, or may have a model based
on contemporary science fiction, and therefore interpret behaviours using a default other
agent theory, which assumes the agent to share human-like motivations. This can be un-
derstood in evolutionary terms through our ancestors’ need to rapidly categorise proximal
activity as either neutral (the rustling of leaves in the wind), friendly (the approach of a
tribe member) or hostile (the approach of a predator or foe). When sensory information
is uncertain, in an environment where one is frequently the prey, not the predator, then
evolving a bias towards an assumption of both agency and hostility is selective for individ-
ual longevity. Even in our technological environments we often experience fake agency,
such as robotic dialing of sales calls, automated twitter postings and auto-generated,
personalised spam emails. These are complex matters and require further research, par-
ticularly to investigate how folk psychology and science fiction affect the ToM humans
use to interpret robot behaviour.
In a study conducted in 2006 in a community hospital in the USA, the nursing staff
were constantly searching for reasons why the robots acted as they did. They would ask
themselves and others, “What is going on here? Is the robot supposed to do this or did I
do something wrong?”. This research asserts that low levels of transparency led people
to question even the normal behaviours of the robot, sometimes even leading people to
think of correct behaviours as errors (Kim & Hinds, 2006).
Hancock et al. (2011) assert that if we cannot trust our robots, we will not be able
to benefit from them effectively. However, given that we happily interact in society with
others whom we do not completely trust, and increasingly we interact with computers
knowing that their recommendations maybe faulty, it may be that Hancock et al. are over
simplifying for the general case. Perhaps what is more important is that humans are able
to correctly calibrate their level of trust appropriately (Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky,
Pierce, & Beck, 2003).
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3. COMPANIONS OR TOOLS: A FALSE DICHOTOMY?
Principle One of the Principles of Robotics asserts that robots are tools. Within industrial
and engineering environments this is fairly clear, in the sense that a human uses the robot
to complete a technical task. The designer and user of the robot share the goal of the
robot: to complete the task. However, within domestic and healthcare environments,
robots may have rather a different relationship with those they interact with. They may
be intended to provide companionship and simultaneous covert monitoring of patient
well-being. They may be tools for the healthcare professional, but for the patient they are
companions. In such an environment the utility may be negatively affected by increased
transparency.
Our sense of companionship is related to the measure of agency we project onto the
robot. If we are able to understand the workings of the intelligence does it inherently
appear to become less intelligent in the folk sense, such that we then project less agency,
and as a result experience less benefit from the robot? We might compare this with
television. We know it has no agency, but its presence in the corner of our sitting room
does provide companion like benefits. Maybe this has to do with the conscious suspension
of disbelief, or maybe we have an unconscious agency detector which is more easily fooled
by technology.
Common-sense notions of intelligence are conflated with folk psychology ideas of agency
and also of living. Things that are intelligent are alive, in the sense that they have their
own beliefs, desires and intentions that we understand are fundamentally self serving,
or selfish. We implicitly recognise selfishness as a fundamental characteristic of all life
(Dawkins, 1976). If such a selfish agent engages with us then it considers us to be im-
portant in the pursuit of these selfish objectives. Such agents are worthy of becoming
our companions because they ascribe true value in their relationship with us, and this
increases our value in society.
Conversely, agents who have no self-serving agency are not worthy of our attention be-
cause they convey no social value. Perhaps therefore, artificial agents whose sole purpose
is companionship and are truly transparent in this respect are thus disqualified from
being worthy companions. In some situations robot transparency may therefore be at
odds with utility, and more generally it may be orthogonal rather than beneficial to the
successful use of the robot.
This argument is at present merely hypothesis; the processes leading to a robot achiev-
ing companion status need to be more thoroughly understood. Whilst we may invent
scenarios and continue to discuss the theoretical and philosophical interplay between
transparency, trust and utility, as scientists we await the outcome of our experiments.
4. RESEARCH PROGRAMME
We are beginning a programme of practical research to investigate the transparency,
trust, utility triangle. Initially using the non-humanoid R5 robot, we are conducting
experiments to determine the effect of various types of robot transparency on mental
models formed by humans. We are also interested in the consequential effect on human
emotional response. At the heart of our experiments we are using reactive planning
techniques to build autonomous agents. We have developed the Instinct reactive planner
(Wortham, Gaudl, & Bryson, 2016) based on Bryson’s POSH (Parallel Ordered Slipstack
Hierarchy) reactive planner and Behaviour Oriented Design (BOD) approach (Bryson,
2001). A POSH plan consists of a Drive Collection containing one or more Drives. Each
4
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Drive has a priority and a releaser. When the Drive is released as a result of sensory input,
a hierarchical plan of Competences, Action Patterns and Actions follows. The Instinct
Planner reports the execution and status of every plan element in real time, allowing us to
implicitly capture the reasoning process within the robot that gives rise to its behaviour.
Our experiments will investigate and demonstrate how this transparency data from the
planner can be used to make the behaviour of a robot more understandable. Initially we
are primarily interested in making the behaviour transparent for a robot designer, since
robots with complex plans are typically very hard to design and debug. However, these
initial experiments may also improve transparency for non-specialist observers.
We will subsequently investigate how we can harness the transparency mechanism
embedded with the Instinct Planner to produce a more effective domestic robot. The
research will investigate whether transparency makes people feel more or less bonded to
their robot, and whether they are more or less able to accurately assess the needs of the
robot, as it works to achieve its goals.
It is anticipated that these trials should take place within a domestic or near-domestic
environment, such as a retirement home. We must gain feedback from non-specialist
observers/users about the qualitative level of intelligence of the robot, and also about
how comfortable they would be to have such a device in their home environment. The
research will attempt to assess initial levels of fear, anxiety, mistrust of AI and robots
in general, and of domestic robots in particular. Having established a reference position,
transparency of the robot must be enabled by providing feedback to the user based on
the real time execution within the reactive planner. The methods we currently envisage
are:
• Real-time presentation of textual statements relating to plan execution.
• Graphical real-time visualisation of plan execution.
• Audio (i.e. verbal) statements relating to robot plan execution.
For each of these methods the transparency information could either be presented
on/from a remote device, or on/from the robot itself. There are thus six possible combina-
tions. Of course additional transparency fusion, such as audio combined with graphical,
could also be tested based on the success or failure of initial experimental results.
As the literature indicates that dialogue is important in establishing trust, this re-
search should give some consideration to the possibility of accepting speech input, albeit
restricted to simple commands, as a means for users to inquire of the robot what it is
doing, and to have the robot respond appropriately.
5. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We have seen that unpacking transparency and trust is complex, but can be partly
understood by looking at how humans come to understand and subsequently trust one
another, and how they overcome evolutionary fears in order to trust other agents, through
implicit non-verbal communication. Unacceptable levels of anxiety, fear and mistrust will
result in an emotional and cognitive response to reject robots.
Finally, there may be applications where transparency is at odds with utility. Our on-
going programme of research is intended to validate our hypothesis that we can indeed
create transparent robots that are nevertheless emotionally engaging and useful tools
across a wide range of domestic and near-domestic environments. Meanwhile, there re-
mains a great of work to be done to unpack the relationship between transparency, utility
and trust.
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